Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press and Contempt by Publication by Hanson, Elisha
Cornell Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 2 February 1942 Article 3
Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press and
Contempt by Publication
Elisha Hanson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elisha Hanson, Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press and Contempt by Publication, 27 Cornell L. Rev. 165 (1942)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol27/iss2/3
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXVII FEBRUARY, 1942 NUMBER 2
THE SUPREME COURT ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
AND CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION
ELISHA HANSON
On December 8, 1941, by a five to four decision of historic dimension
embracing two cases,' the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
judgments of conviction for contempt of state courts based upon publications
in newspapers of comments relating to pending litigation.
The majority opinion is of tremendous importance because it clarifies the
proper constitutional limits of the judicial power to punish summarily for
contempt by publication in the press of views pertaining to matters which
have not been finally adjudicated in the courts.
It is notable in two respects. First, it adopts for the first time in out-of-
court contempt by publication cases the "clear and present danger" test,
described by the Court as "a working principle that the substantive evil must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished." Counsel for petitioners in the Times-Mirror
case were thus upheld in their contention that the "clear and present danger"
test was the standard best suited to the full preservation of a free press
without sacrifice of any part of the equally important right to a fair trial
by an independent judiciary. Second, the majority of the Court asserted in
unmistakable language that the First Amendment, whose commands are ad-
dressed to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, was intended to
give to liberty of the press "the broadest scope that could be countenanced
in an orderly society."
In the one case, that of Bridges v. State of California,2 a telegram addressed
'Bridges v. State of California, Times-Mirror Co. and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior
Court of California, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941).2 Supra note 1. For the opinion of the Supreme Court of California, see 14 Cal. (2d)
464, 94 P. (2d) 983 (1939). The text of the Bridges telegram was as follows:
"This decision is outrageous considering I. L. A. has 15 members (in San Pedro) and
the International Longshoremen-Warehousemen's Union has 3000. International Long-
shoremen-Warehousemen Union has petitioned the Labor Board for certification to rep-
resent San Pedro longshoremen with International Longshoremen Association denied
representation because it represents only 15 men. Board hearing held; decision now
pending. Attempted enforcement of Schmidt decision will tie up port of Los Angeles
and involve entire Pacific Coast. 'International Longshoremen-Warehousemen Union,
representing.,over 11,000 of the 12,000 longshoremen on the Pacific Coast, does not intend
to allow statdeourts, to 'override the majority vote of members in choosing its officers
and representatives -aid to override the National Labor Relations Board."
.CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
by Bridges to the Secretary of Labor, criticizing a judge who had granted
an injunction in a labor dispute, was published with his assent in California
newspapers while a motion for a new trial was pending in the case. In the
other case, that of Tines-Mirror Company and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior
Court of California,s the publication was in the form of three editorials in
the Los Angeles Times commenting *upon pending cases in circumstances
hereinafter more fully described.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion for the majority of the Court, in
which Justices Reed, Douglas, Murphy, and Jackson joined. The dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter was concurred in by Chief Justice Stone
and Justices Roberts and Byrnes. All of the Justices agreed that two of the
editorials in the Times were not contemptuous.
In both cases petitioners contended in the trial and appellate' courts of
California that the convictions were in violation of freedom of speech and
of the press as guaranteed by the First4 and Fourteenth5 Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States.
Background of the Problem
The proper yardstick for the exercise of the contempt power in a manner
consistent with the constitutional guarantee of a free press has long been
the subject of controversy.6  Although the power itself is now generally
recognized, 7 the law of contempt by publication has had a checkered history
in the legislatures and in the courts. State statutes aimed at restrictions of
the power were largely nullified by judicial rulings," and, in .the absence of
statute, the decisions of the state courts produced a conflict over the nature
and scope of the contempt power.9 In the federal field the Act of March 2,
1831, regulating the power of federal courts to punish summarily contempts
outside the courtroom was recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in
SSupra note 1. For opinion of Supreme Court of California, see 15 Cal. (2d) 99, 98 P
(2d) 1029 (1940).4
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
" ". . . Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .....6 See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States (1928) 28 Co. L.
REv. 401, 525; (1938) 48 YAIm L. J. 54; (1938) 7 GEo. WASH. L. RFv. 234.70n the origin and development of the power, see Sm JoHiN Fox, THE HIsToRy OF
CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927); THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMEPT OF COURT (1934);
Nelles and King, supra note 6 passim. The evolution of the power in the United States
is summarized in the majority and dissenting opinions in the instant cases. 62 Sup. Ct.
at 195-196, 204-206.5Statutes and cases are collected in Nelles and King, szpra note 6, at 536-562.
9(1938) 7 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 236-237; (1938) 48 Yale L. J. 60-61, 63-65.
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Nye v. United States'0 so as to narrow the scope of the power, thereby
overruling Toledo Newspaper Conmpany v. United States," which held sway
for twenty-three years.
In the present cases the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the
power of a state court, in the absence of any specific declaration of legislative
policy, to impose penalties for contempt attributable to comments in the
public press relating to pending court actions. State power under such
circumstances was first tested in the Supreme Court in Patterson v. Colo-
rado,12 but in that case the Court left undecided the question of the relation
of the First to the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. Since then the Supreme Court has definitely held that the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes a state from abridging freedom of speech and of the
press as they are guaranteed by the First Amendment.13 Consequently,
the present cases shed new light on this constitutional phase. By re-exam-
ining the whole problem of the judicial power over contempt by publication
the Court furnishes guides to both state and federal courts on a momentous
issue of national constitutional policy. As Mr. Justice Black said, in de-
ciding whether such exercise of power was forbidden by the "sweeping
constitutional mandate" against any law abridging the freedom of the press,
the Court was "necessarily measuring a power of all American courts, both
state and federal," including the Supreme Court itself.
Genesis of Times-Mirror Case
In this article only the facts of the Times-Mirror case will be given ex-
tended consideration. The genesis of the contempt proceedings in that case
deserves more detailed description than is afforded by the opinions of the
Court.
The record shows that on June 3, 1938, upon application supported by an
affidavit of a committee of a Los Angeles Bar Association, two citations
10313 U. S. 33, 61 Sup. Ct. 810 (1941). The Act of March 2, 1831, 4 STAr. 487 (1831),
28 U.S.C. § 385, provided that the power of federal courts to inflict summary punishment
for contempt "shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of
any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice... .
The Court held in the Nye case that it was not sufficient that the misbehavior charged
had some direct relation to the work of the court, since the word "near" suggests physical
proximity, not relevancy, and the words "so near thereto" have a geographical and not a
causal connotation.
11247 U. S. 402, 38. Sup. Ct. 560 (1918). The majority opinion in the Toledo case
has been criticized in Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts (1924) 37 HAV. L REv. 1010, 1029-
1038.
12205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (1907).
13Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
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for criminal contempt were issued by the Superior Court for the County
of Los Angeles addressed to The Times-Mirror Company, publisher, and
L. D. Hot chkiss, managing editor, of the Los Angeles Tihes.14 No judge
or public official was a party to the institution of the proceedings and the
court permitted the attorneys of the Bar Association to prosecute the pro-
ceedings to judgment over the protests of petitioners. The proceedings
were summary.15
In its affidavit filed with the trial court the Bar Association committee
alleged that five editorials published in the Times over a period of months
were contemptuous. Three of the editorials had been published approxi-
mately five months, four months, and two months respectively prior to the
filing of the Association's affidavit."6 It was apparent that the editorials
had been selected for a test case against the Times after a systematic study
of editorial comment in that newspaper over a long period of time. After
the first contempt proceeding was instituted, the Bar Association committee
instituted a second proceeding by an affidavit alleging that two editorials
published by the Times since the first proceeding was initiated and in which
the Times defended its right to comment were also contemptuous.' 7
To say the least this action of the Association laid that body open to an
inference that it was prompted by a dislike for the editorial policy of the
Times. Even if it were inferred that the Association had acted out of a
desire to protect the judiciary from interference with impartial administra-
tion of justice the precedent it attempted to set is a dangerous one. Punish-
ment for contempt by publication is a vindication of a public wrong. A
proceeding of that character should be initiated only by the state and in its
name or at least by the court itself. There was nothing in the record to
show that the editorials had come to the attention of judges before whom
the matters were pending or that any judge had directed the Association
to make its inquiry because he sensed intimidation. There was no showing
that any of the defendants whose activities were commented upon in the
Times complained of prejudicial effects of the editorials.
No private individual or group of private individuals should be permitted
to plant in the mind of a judge interpretations of editorial comment which
would not have taken "root there but for officious intermeddling. The court,
14Transcript of Record in Times-Mirror Co. and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior Court of
California, supra note 1 at 9-26.15Id. at 27, 58-59, 66-86, 89-90. Proposals have been made to eliminate summary pun-
ishment in contempt by publication cases and to substitute therefor the usual rules of
criminal proceedings. (1938) 7 GEo. WAsn. L. Rxv. 241; (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 66.
16Transcript of Record, supra note 14, at 10, 13, 16.
'
7Petitioners'. Brief in'the Supreme Court of California in Times-Mirror Co. and L. D.
Hotchkiss v. Superior Court of California at 3-5.
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not a bar association, is empowered to punish for contemptuous publications.
If it is appropriate for a bar association committee to become a self-appointed
public censor of the press, then the door is opened to other vicarious avengers
of real or imagined interferences with the judicial process.
The trial court rendered judgments of conviction on five out of the seven
editorials. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the convictions s in
respect of the three editorials now reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.
Each of the editorials was published after a verdict had been rendered by
the jury. The first two editorials provoked no difference of opinion among
the members of the Supreme Court.19 The dissenting Justices differed with
'
8 Transcript of Record, .rupra note 14, at 94-118.
19The first editorial, "Sit-Strikers Convicted," was published December 21, 1937, the
day after the jury had returned a verdict of guilty and the day before the trial judge was
to pronounce sentence, hear motions for a new trial and applications for probation. The
editorial read as follows:
"The verdict of a jury finding guilty the twenty-two sit-strikers who led the assault
on the Douglas plant last February, will have reverberations up and down the Pacific
Coast and in points farther east.
"The verdict means that Los Angeles is still Los Angeles, that the city is aroused to
the danger of davebeckism, and that no kind of union terrorism will be permitted here.
"The verdict may have a geod deal to do with sending Dave Beck back to Seattle.
For, while the United Automobile Workers have no connection with Beck, their tactics
and his are identical in motive; and if Beck can be convinced that this kind of warfare
is not permitted in this area he will necessarily abandon his dreams of conquest.
"Already the united farmers and ranchers have given Beck a severe setback. The
Hynes hay market is still free and it has been made plain that interference with milk
deliveries to Los Angeles will not be tolerated.
"Dist.-Atty. Fitts pledged his best efforts to prevent and punish union terrorism and
racketeering in a strong radio address, and followed it up yesterday with a statement con-
gratulating the jury that convicted the sit-downers and the community on one of the
'most far-reaching verdicts in the history of this country.'
"In this he is correct. It is an important verdict. For the first time since the present
cycle of labor disturbances began, union lawlessness has been treated as exactly what it
is, an offense against the public peace punishable like any other crime.
"The seizure of property by a militant minority, which arrogated to itself the right of
dictating not only to employers, but to other workers not in sympathy with it, what
should be the terms and conditions of working, has proved to be within the control of
local peace officers and authorities.
"Nobody ran off to Washington to get this affair handled. It was attended to right
here.
"Government may have broken down in other localities; while States may have yielded
to anarchy. But Los Angeles county stands firm; it has officers who can do their duty
and courts and juries which can function.
"So long as that is the case, davebeckism cannot and will not get control here; nor
johnlewisism either."
The second editorial, "The Fall of an Ex-Queen," was published April 14, 1938, two
days after the jury verdict of guilty and before the trial judge had pronounced sentence.
The text of the editorial was as follows:
"Politics as we know it is an essentially selfish business, conducted in the main for
personal profit of one kind or another. When it is of the boss type, it is apt to be pretty
sordid as well. Success in boss-ship, which is a denial of public rights, necessarily implies
1942]
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the majority only upon the propriety of the third editorial entitled "Probation
for Gorillas ?" This editorial was published about five weeks prior to the
date set by the trial judge for sentencing and passing upon an appplication
for probation of two labor leaders. It denounced these defendants for as-
saulting non-union truck drivers with a deadly weapon, the offense of which
they had been found guilty. The editorial concluded with the following
comment:
"Judge A. A. Scott will make a serious mistake if he grants probation
to Matthew Shannon and Kennan Holmes. This community needs the
example of their assignment to the jute mill."
Approach in the Majority Opinion
The approach of the majority of the Supreme Court to the issue before it
must be carefully noted. Mr. Justice Black began his opinion by emphasizing
that the Court was passing upon the exercise of power by a judge which had
been upheld by the highest court of the state of California-a reviewing
function of a delicate nature. But California had not declared a legislative
policy to punish contempts of the sort here involved. On the contrary, the
only manifestation was a statute which in terms narrowly limited the power
and ran afoul the California Constitution.2 ' On the facts of the case, there-
a kind of moral obliquity if not an actually illegal one.
"So that it is something of a contradiction of sense if not of terms to express regret
that the political talents of Mrs. Helen Werner were not directed to other objectives
than those which, in the twilight of her active life, have brought her and her husband to
disgrace. If they had been, she would not have been in politics at all and probably
would never have been heard of in a public way. Her natural flair was purely political;
she would have been miscast in any other sphere of activity.
"Mrs. Werner's primary mistake seems to have been in failing to recognize that her
political day was past. For years she enjoyed the unique distinction of being the coun-
try's only woman boss-and did she enjoy it! In her heyday she had a finger in every
political pie and many were the plums she was able to extract therefrom for those who
played ball with her. From small beginnings she utilized every opportunity to extend her
influence and to put officeholders and promising political material under obligations to
her. She became a power in the backstage councils of city and county affairs and from
that place of strategic advantage reached out to pull the strings on State and legislative
offices as well.
. "Those were the days when Mrs. Werner was 'Queen Helen' and it is only fair to say
that to her the power was much more important than the perquisites. When the
inevitable turning of the political wheel brought new figures to the front and new
bosses to the back, she found her grip slipping and it was hard to take. The several
cases which in recent years have brought her before the courts to defend her activities
seem all examples of an energetic effort to regain and reassert her onetime influence in
high places. That it should ultimately have landed her behind the bars as a convicted
bribe-seeker is not illogical. But if there is logic in it, the money meant less to Mrs.
Werner than the name of still being a political power, one who could do things with
public officials that others could not do. To herself at least she was still Queen Helen."
2 0 The third editorial in its entirety is set forth infra note 65.2 1Bridges v. State of California, 14 Cal. (2d) 464, 94 P. (2d) 983 (1939); Times-
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fore, the Supreme Court was dealing with convictions for contempt based
upon "a common law concept of the most general and undefined nature."
Since the California legislature had not declared that publications in situa-
tions like the Times-Mirror case create a specific danger sufficiently imminent
to justify restraint by judicial decree, the Supreme Court was free to decide
as an original question whether the :words of the publication were used "in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the sub'stantive evils" of disrespect for the
judiciary and unfair administration of justice. But, said the Court, the evil
itself must be substantial and it must be serious; and so
"What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a
working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be pun-
ished."2
Nothing is more significant in the majority opinion than this recognition
of the "clear and present danger" standard as a "minimum cormpulsion of the
Bill of Rights," and not as marking "the furthermost constitutional bound-
aries of protected expression." First utilized in cases arising under the fed-
eral espionage laws,23 the "clear and present danger" test was subsequently
applied by either a majority or minority of the Supreme Court in cases in-
volving state criminal syndicalism 24 and anti-insurrection laws ;- and recently
it has been extended by the Court to breaches of peace at common law26 and
to picketing in labor disputes.27
So far as contempt by publication is concerned this means that the Court
Mirror Co. and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior Court of California, 15 Cal. (2d) 99, 98 P.
(2d) 1029 (1940). The California Code of Civil Procedure, CAL. CODE CIrV. PRoc. (Deer-
ing, 1937) § 1209 (13) provides:
•.. no speech or publication reflecting upon or concerning any court or any officer
thereof shall be treated or punished as a contempt of such court unless made in the
immediate presence of such court while in session and in such a manner as to actually
interfere with its proceedings".
Concerning this statute Mr. Justice Black said:
"The California Supreme Court's decision that the statute is invalid under the Califor-
nia constitution is an authoritative determination of that point. But the inferences as to
the legislature's appraisal of the danger arise from the enactment, and are therefore un-
changed by the subsequent judicial treatment of the statute." (Note 3 in majority opin-
ion, 62 Sup. Ct. at 193.)
2262 Sup. Ct at 194.
23Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919) ; Abrams v. United
States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919).24Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927) (concurring opinion of
Brandeis, J.)25Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct 732 (1937).26Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900 (1940).27Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940); Carlson v. California,
310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
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has definitely rejected the doctrine that judicial power in that sphere may be
validly exercised merely when the publication is deemed to have a "reasonable
tendency" to interfere with the orderly adminisfration of justice in pending
controversies. The "reasonable tendency" test was the basis upon which the
judgments of conviction were affirmed by the California Supreme Court in
the Times-Mirror case28 and it was also the ground upon which other state
courts have rested convictions. 9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter comes to its de-
fense in his dissenting opinion.
Divergent Approach in the Dissenting Opinion
The fundamental divergence in the approach taken by the dissenting mem-
bers provides a striking contrast. "In lawv... where one ends, depends much
on one's starting point." Mr. Justice Frankfurter views the problem from the
standpoint of the maintenance of our dual system of government under which
the powers of the states must be meticulously" respected. In the eyes of the
dissenters the decision of the majority is
"a denial to the people of the forty-eight states of a right which they
have always regarded as essential for the effective exercise of the judicial
process, as well as a denial to the Congress of powers which were exer-
cised from the very beginning even by the framers of the Constitution
themselves."30
In strong language the minority of the Court charge the majority opinion
with "careful ambiguities and silences," with giving constitutional sanctity to
trial by newspapers, with being "devoid of any frank recognition of the right
of courts to deal with utterances calculated to intimidate the fair course of
justice," with being "strangely silent in failing to avow the specific consti-
tutional provision upon which its decision rests."
These accusations are as starting as they are unfounded. As already
shown, the majority opinion does not equivocate. It is forthright in its articu-
lation of every one of the points which the minority complains was left
clouded. The reasons for the clash of views within the Court lie deeper than
the rhetorical reproaches of.the dissenting opinion indicate.
To begin with, the major premise of the minority is based upon the fallacy
that the cases before the Court are to be likened to those cases where legisla-
tive determinations in the field of competing social policies are to be given
the greatest possible weight. As Mr. Justice Black pertinently remarked,
2STimes-Mirror Co. and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior Court of California, 15 Cal. (2d)
99, 98 P. (2d) 1029 (1940).29Nelles and King, supra note 6, at 554-562; (1938) 7 GFo. WAsHr. L. REv. 236-237;
(1938) 48 YALE L J. 60-61.
3062 Sup. Ct. at 202.
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the judgments of the California courts did not come before the Supreme
Court "encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation." The
issue, therefore, was not solely that of mediation between claims of sovereign
powers of states and nation expressed in legislative policies but rather the
issue was what standard of judgment does the Constitution compel as a
single measure of the power of all the courts to punish contemptuous publi-
cations.
Civil liberties do not stop at state lines. Freedom of the press cannot
flourish as a national policy if each state can make it mean different things
in different localities. It certainly is a matter of concern to all the people
what California does to restrict freedom of expression. Subtle encroachments
upon the freedom of publication in one state invite like encroachments in
other states. Similarly, as the dissent itself admits, impartial administration
of justice is everyone's concern and is not specially entrusted to the courts of
California.
The majority find their answer in history. So do the minority, but they
read history differently. Whereas the majority believe that the power under
review must be judged by American instruments of government forged in
the period of the Revolution and adoption of the Bill of Rights out of a pat-
tern that deviated from the English model, Mr. Justice Frankfurter ex-
presses the view that the power exerted by the California courts is deeply
rooted in the English common law as it was known at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution.
The rationale of the dissenting opinion will be completely misread unless
the reader's attention is constantly focused upon its insistence'that the power
in question has a historic continuity that stems from the English system of
administering justice as it evolved from the early eighteenth century and was
later absorbed by American state and federal courts into our nineteenth- and
twentieth-century institutions. Among the rules of law thus absorbed, says
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, was the historic "reasonable tendency" test as
applied to exercises of the contempt power in the circumstances of cases such
as the present ones.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's deep reverence for English legal institutions has
been too often expressed in his legal writings to occasion surprise at its re-
flection in the present opinion. What is surprising is that the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Roberts should have concurred not only in the result but in
the reasoning by which that result was reached by the minority. Former
opinions in free speech and free press cases in which Chief Justice Stone
joined and in which Mr. Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Courts'
-
3 1Mr. Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court in which Stone, J., joined in
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now make strange reading in the light of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's repeated
obeisances to the standards of English common law institutions as age-old
symbols before which the framers of our Constitution worshipped. Whether
the majority turned their backs on history, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter says,
is a question which calls for discussion before proceeding to other doctrinal
phases.
Historical Background and Interpretation of First Ainendment
The correctness of the Court's adoption of the "clear and present danger"
test in the cases under discussion can be appreciated only in the light of the
historical background of the First Amendment and its interpretation by the
Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Black aptly observes:
" . . . the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits
'any law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' It must be
taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in
the context of. a liberty-loving society, will allow."32
This is undoubtedly the true historic concept of the guarantee. The repudi-
ation in the majority opinion of the dissenting view that the scope and content
of the First Amendment are to be measured by the English common law
at the time the Constitution was adopted is amply corroborated by state-
ments of the framers of the Constitution and by historical researches of
scholars of unquestioned reputation.s
It is generally known that the United States Constitution as originally
drafted did not' contain guarantees of certain fundamental liberties. The citi-
zens of the states expressed dissatisfaction particularly with the absence of
the guarantee of freedom of the press. James Madison's proposals for a Bill
of Rights, as Mr. Justice Black stresses, were presented with a warning that
the Magna Charta did not contain any provisions for the security of the great
rights of trial by jury, freedom of the press, and liberty of conscience, "re-
specting which the people of America are most alarmed," and "the freedom
Herndon v. Lowry, supra, note 25 (5-4 decision) ; Schneider v. State (Town of Irving-
ton), 308 U. S. '147, 61 Sup. Ct. 46 (1939) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, supra note 26 (Stone, J., joined a unanimous Court). Stone and Roberts,
JJ., joined a unanimous Court in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup.
Ct. 444 (1936) and Lovell v. Griffin,- 302 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938), and were
with the majority of the Court in Near v. Minnesota, supra note 13 (5-4 decision);
Thornhill v. Alabama, and Carlson v. California, both supra note 27. Mr. Justice Rob-
erts sat on the majority of the Court which decided De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353,
57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1937) (Stone, J., not sitting).
3262 Sup._Ct. at 194..33CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrIm STATES (1941) c. 1 contains full documenta-
tion of historical source material on this subject.
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.of the press and rights of congcience, those choicest privileges of the people,
are unguarded in the British Constitution."3 4
In his writings Madison expressly stated that "the state of the press ...
under the common law, cannot . . . be the standard of its freedom in the
United States. ''3 The majority opinion also quotes from Schofield, whose
historical research led him to say
"One of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English
common law on liberty of speech and of the press."36
The historical evidence is overwhelming in support of the Court's conclu-
sion that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to secure to the people of the
United States greater fundamental rights than the people of Great Britain
enjoyed, including an enlargement of the concept of freedom of the press.
As stated by the majority of the Court:
"... the First Amendment cannot reasonably be taken as approving
prevalent English practices. On the contrary, the only conclusion sup-
ported by history is that the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the
framers were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other lib-
erties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly so-
ciety."37
This can only mean that the power of judges to punish for contempt by
publication outside the courtroom must be governed by the same criteria as
are applicable by reason of the First Amendment'to other types of expression.
The.editorials in the Times-Mirror case cannot be placed in "a special cate-
gory marked off by history" untouched by the commands of the First Amend-
ment.. This is not to deny the existence of the power of the courts to protect
the integrity of the judicial process; rather it is to warn that the power must
be kept within bounds. In fact popular displeasure over the abuses of the
power brought about legislative curbs upon summary punishment for con-
temptuous publications in the post-ratification period3 8 Still later some
states by statute specifically proscribed the "reasonable tendency" test as a
measure of the power3 9
In Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,40 the "reasonable tendency"
34Annals of Congress 1789-1790 at 434, cited in majority opinion.
35VI WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1790-1802 at 387, cited in majority opinion.3 6Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the United States, 9 PuB. AMER. SocIoL. Soc. 67,
76, cited in the majority opinion. See also CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 4 et seq.
and 14 et seq.
3762 Sup. Ct. at 195.38See note 11 in majority opinion, 62 Sup. Ct. ;t 195, and note 2 in dissenting opinion,
62 Sup. Ct. at 205.39Nelles and King supra Tiote 6, at 554-562.
40247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1918). The celebrated case of judge Peck which led
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test was applied, over the protest of Mr. Justice Holmes, in interpreting the
federal act of 1831 regulating contempts. The Court now specifically states
that the Toledo case was overruled "in the belief that it improperly enlarged
the stated area of summary punishment." The fact that some states by stat-
ute or decision have sanctioned the "reasonable tendency" test was not
deemed by the Court a reason for ignoring the commands of the First
Amendment in the instant cases, notwithstanding the existence of other un-
tested state decisions.
In attributing to the First Amendment the greatest possible scope of oper-
atio.n the majority opinion is consistent with and reaffirms pronouncements
of the Court in previous freedom of the press cases. The foundation case
of the series is Near v. Minnesota,41 in which the Court declared void a legis-
lative attempt to suppress a newspaper by injunctive process. Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes quoted from Madison to the effect that liberty of the press
was a grant of immunity from previous executive and legislative restraint or
censorship. The Near case consigned to oblivion the Blackstonian theory
that immunity from restraints prior to publication exhausted the constitu-
tional guarantee.42  On the contrary the First Amendment was declared to
prohibit any form of abridgement of a free press. The Court held that the
rule of subsequent liability to the person injured by publication was the proper
one to be applied. Any other smacked of restraint.
Since Near v. Minnesota it has been made free from doubt that the First
Amendment preserves liberty of distribution as well as liberty to publish.
In Grosfean v. American Press Company4" a license tax on the advertising
revenues of newspapers and magazines with a circulation in excess of 20,000
a week was held invalid because of its direct tendency to restrict circulation.
Restraints imposed by an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of lifterature 44
without a permit or by similar ordinances in the guise of exercises of the
"police power" to prevent the littering or obstruction of streets45 have also
been adjudged repugnant to liberty of circulation. Likewise, limitations upon
to the passage of the federal Act of March 2, 1831, was recently reviewed in Nye v.
United States, supra note 10.
See also STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833); Nelles and
King, supra note 6, at 423-430; note 3 in dissenting opinion, 62 Sup. Ct. at 205.
41283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).42This exploded theory is forcefully criticized by Professor Chafee in his FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITE STATES (1941) at 9-11.
In Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 at 51-52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249 (1919), Mr.
Justice Holmes repudiated his adoption of the Blackstone theory in Patterson v. Color-
ado, 205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (1907).
43297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936).
44Lovell v. Griffin, 302 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666.45Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 61 Sup. Ct. 46 (1939);
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
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publication incident to peaceful picketing have fallen under the ban.46
In the present cases the Court has gone to the furthermost point in any
case to date. Freedom from encroachments by the judicial branch of the
government is now made part of the predominant purpose "to preserve an
untrammeled press as a vital source of public information." Any other doc-
trine would exempt the judiciary from the constitutional limitations imposed
upon the other branches of government. This would have the anomalous
consequence of making judges paramount to the Constitution and to the gov-
ernment of which they are an integral part.
The language of the majority opinion comes as close as it could to a declar-
ation that the grant of immunity in the First Amendment is absolute but
without making it literally so. The press, to be sure, is answerable for abuses
to which the general laws apply, such as libel, but subsequent punishment for
such abuses as may exist must not curtail the right itself. Undoubtedly Mr.
Justice Black's words should be so interpreted.
The California Supreme Court declared that: "Liberty of the press is sub-
ordinate to the independence of the judiciary."47 This evoked from Mr. Jus-
tice Black the comment that if these "two of the most cherished policies of
our civilization" were really in conflict "it would be a trying task to choose
between them."
The truth of the matter is that the Court was confronted with the task of
reconciling two rights "in order to prevent either from destroying the other."48
One right is freedom of oral and written expression; the other is the right
to a fair trial. If the two are in apparent or real conflict, the court is under
a duty to make a proper accommodation between them so as to preserve the
essentials of both, for obviously one is as fundamental as the other in the
American constitutional system.
Underlying the reconciliation of these rights lies a balancing of individual
and social interests in keeping open the channels of inquiry and discussion
on matters of public importance. 49 Freedom of the press reflecfs a general
social interest. The functions of the daily press embrace the gathering and
dissemination of information in the form of news, editorial comment, and
advertising.
News is factual information concerning matters of public importance that
46Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940) ; Carlson v. California,
310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).47Times-Mirror Co. and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior Court of California, 15 Cal. (2d)
99 at 118, 98 P. (2d) 1029 at 1040 (1940).48Cf. Frandurter, J., in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 at 594,
60 Sup. Ct. 1010 at 1012 (1940).
49(1925) 20 ILT.. L. REv. 191 (Comment by Professor Albertsworth) ; Chused, Public
Comment as Contempt of Court (1930) 16 ST. Louis L. Rav. 24 at 48.
1942]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
in the judgment of the editor is of sufficient general interest to warrant publi-
cation. Editorial comment is discussion of such matters from the analytical
or critical viewpoint. It includes expression of opinion.
Advertising is information concerning the goods, services, or ideas of one
who is willing to pay to have' that information disseminated through the
press. The protection of advertising is essentially important from an histori-
cal point of view. To illustrate, if the newspapers of California which printed
Mr. Bridges' telegram, in the exercise of their editorial judgment, had con-
sidered it of insufficient news value to justify publication, then Mr. Bridges
would have had other courses open to him. He might have obtained the pub-
lication of his protest in the advertising columns of the newspapers by paying
their respective charges therefor or he might have printed it in pamphlet form
and distributed it as our forefathers were wont to do with their protests
against what they regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable abuses of power by
government.
In the performance of its functions the press fulfills a historic objective of
the discovery and diffusion of knowledge. Judge Cooley stated that the pur-
pose was
" . . . to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public
concern, to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and
public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the
government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by
any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority
which the people have conferred upon them." 50
This expresses the great truth that freedom of the press is the right of the
people and one not lightly to be curtailed.
There are no favorites in the Bill of Rights. All of the liberties embodied
therein are reciprocally related to the common end of preserving democratic
processes for the whole people. Every right, however, is susceptible of
abuse. When one right collides with another by disregard of correlative
duties it becomes the task of the courts as the guardians of all our liberties
to make the adjustment. This is exactly what the Court has done in the
Times-Mirror case with due respect for the broad commands of the First
Amendment, "the breach of which cannot be tolerated."
In taking that position the majority do not fail to recognize, as the minority
insist, the power of the courts to punish utterances which subvert the fair
course of justice. In its eagerness to demonstrate that this lacuna exists, a
large part of the dissenting opinion is devoted to elucidation of obvious prin-
ciples upon which the majority no doubt would readily agree, including the
502 CooLEY, CONsTrruToNAL LIMITATIONS (Sth ed. 1927) 886.
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principle that California has the right to safeguard her system of judicial
tribunals against intimidation and coercive interferences. The issue between
the majority and the minority thus resolved itself into: What standard shall
be employed to determine whether publication of comments on pending cases
produces such interferences? The majority opinion resolved this issue by
adopting the "clear and present danger" test and by rejecting the "reasonable
tendency" test.
Critique of "Reasonable Tendency" Test
The "reasonable tendency" test is so vague in its contours as to spread a
"dragnet which may enmesh anyone" who ventures to comment upon pending
court proceedings. To sanction such a nebulous standard as a measure of
power is to sanction a pervasive threat of censorship which is aggravated by
the very nature of summary punishment for contempt. A test that is "so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application" effectively breeds a silence coerced by law.
Unless the power is exercised with utmost caution and is scrupulously confined
to the clearest cases of abuse of free expression, freedom of the press would
become "an empty phrase."
The majority opinion in the Times-Mirror case faces realities by weighing
the practical effects of the "reasonable tendency" test upon liberty 6f ex-
pression on highly controversial matters which are likely to become the sub-
ject of litigation. The press performs its highest function in reporting and
analyzing political, economic, and social developments in the disputed field of
public policy. But this freedom would be reduced to "a mere intellectual
abstraction" if the press were inhibited by a brooding omnipresence of fear
engendered by a "threat to censor comments on matters of public concern."5 1
The "reasonable tendency" test creates such a threat. As the Court well
said, the punishment of utterances made during the pendency of a case pro-
duces "restrictive results at the precise time when public interest in the mat-
ters discussed would naturally be at its height." The majority opinion also
stresses the fact that under the "reasonable tendency" test the ban is likely
to fall upon the most important topics of discussion, such as the labor contro-
versies out of which some of the Times editorials arose. The indefiniteness
of the prohibition against comment on pending causes subjects newspaper
publishers to such hazards as to confine editorial discussion substantially to
"abstract academic discussion of non-controversial matters or of issues long
51
"It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat
inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion."
(Emphasis supplied.) Per Murphy, J., in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 at 97, 60
Sup. Ct. 736 at 742 (1940).
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dead" and to colorless facts.52  In such circumstances the press could not
effectively pqrform its function as "one of the greatesi interpreters between
the government and the people." On this phase Mr. Justice Black concludes:
"No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there
guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeli-
ness and importance of the ideas seeking expression. Yet, it would fol-
low as a practical result of the decisions below that anyone who might
wish to give public expression to his views on a pending case involving
no matter what problem of public interest, just at the time his audience
would be most receptive, would be as effectively discouraged as if a deli-
berate statutory scheme of censorship had been adopted. Indeed, perhaps
more so, because under a legislative specification of the particular kinds
of expressions prohibited and the circumstances under which the prohibi-
tions are to operate, the speaker or publisher might at least have an
authoritative guide to the permissible scope of comment, instead of being
compelled to act at the peril that judges might find in the utterance a
'reasonable tendency' to obstruct justice in a pending case."53
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter argues that the "reason-
able tendency" test is an age-old formulation of a rule of law from which the
"clear and present danger" phrase differs only in literary expression-as he
says, "an idle play on words." According to the dissent, the phrase "clear
and present danger" is "merely a justification for curbing utterances where
that is warranted by the substantive evil to be prevented," namely, interfer-
ence with impartial administration. Both tests, argued the minority, present
the same question of proximity and degree in determining what interferences
are punishable as contempt; both tests declare a "rule of reason" 'to be applied
to the circumstances of the particular case by an exercise of good judgment.
As already shown, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's appeal to antiquity in support
of the "reasonable tendency" test is based upon a misinterpretation of the
history of the First Amendment. Moreover, however appropriate a "rule of
reason" may be in other spheres of state and federal powers, the dissenting
opinion's assimilation of the "clear and present danger" test to the "rule of
reason" ignores the persuasive analogy in the espionage, criminal syndi-
calism, and similar cases of the law of attempts in criminal proceedings.5 4
The "reasonable tendency" test is too subjective in its quality to satisfy this
analogy. Time and again, either in majority or dissenting opinions, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that it was reaching for some guide, how-
52See criticisms of "reasonable tendency" test in the dissenting opinion of Gibson, J.,
in Times-Mirror Co. and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior Court of California, 15 Cal. (2d)
99 at 124-125, 98 P. (2d) 1029 at 1042-1043.
362 Sup. Ct. at 196-197.54See cases cited mtpra notes 23-25.
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ever difficult it has been to formulate, which removes the peril of the gener-
ality of "reasonable tendency."55  The fact that a few phrases of former
opinions seem to sanction the "rule of reason" cannot override the final
emergence of the "clear and present danger" standard as portrayed by Mr.
Justice Black.
The dissenting opinion merely rationalizes its misinterpretation of history
by belittling the distinctions made in an important series of free speech and
free press cases. Many grave questions of constitutional rights, and indeed
our whole body of legal conceptions, turn upon shades of meaning in words.
One has only to examine the daily grist of legal opinions to realize the full
force of this assertion.
Permissible Comment and the Pending Case
The peril of censorship is not removed merely because the ban is limited
to pending litigation. When is a proceeding "pending"? In the state courts
the decisions on this question have long been in conflict.5 6 Some courts have
regarded a case as "pending" until every conceivable legal procedure in con-
nection therewith has been exhausted. In the Times-Mirror case the edito-
rials were published after rendition of the jury's verdict, a period of "relative
finality," as one judge observed.5 7  The Supreme Court did not attempt to
delimit the period during which a case may be described as "pending"; but
that the Court was fully aware of the "censorial quality" of restraint upon
comment during this period, whether it be short or long, is shown by the
following quotation from its opinion:
"An endless series of moratoria on public discussion, even if each were
very short, could hardly be dismissed as an insignificant abridgment of
freedom of expression. And to assume that each would be short is to
overlook the fact that the 'pendency' of a case is frequently a matter of
months or even years rather than days or weeks.
'58
It is easy to imagine the restraints upon free expression under an elastic
definition of a "pending" cause. Should press comments on the celebrated
Sacco-Vanzetti case have been proscribed during the more than six years
that case was in the courts? Capital cases always present the problem in
W5Ibid.56(1938) 7 GEo. WASHa. L. Ra,. 237; (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 61.
57Per Gibson, J., dissenting in Times-Mirror Co. and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior
Court of California, 15 Cal. (2d) 99 at 129, 98 P. (2d) 1029 at 1045. Curiously enough,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion (62 Sup. Ct. at 210) referred to the
jury verdict discussed in the "Sit-Strikers" editorial as "a completed action of the
court."
5862 Sup. Ct. at 197.
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acute form, since a convicted defendant may resort to various proceedings
in the courts after verdict and before sentence and may thereafter seek execu-
tive clemency by commutation of the sentence or by pardon. When is his fate
finally determined ?59
No practical guidance in resolving these ambiguities is found in the dis-
senting opinion. The particular litigation, says Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
must be "immediately pending" and this is "to be determined by the substan-
tial realities of the specific situation." What is "the particular litigation" or
the particular phase of the proceeding upon which the comment is made?
When is the case "actively pending" before a court and before what court?
Trial, appellate, or Supreme? To say that this is not "a technical lawyer's
problem" is itself an escape from the "substantial realities" of the techniques
of legal procedure.
It is apparent that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's criteria are as vague as any
that have been suggested. The quandary in which such a doctrine would have
placed Justice Frankfurter in March, 1927, when as Professor of Law in
Harvard University, he wrote an article on "The Case of Sacco and Van-
zetti" 6° is strikingly shown by the following events.
Sacco and Vanzetti were found guilty of murder in the first degree in a
trial lasting nearly seven weeks at Dedham, Massachusetts, before Judge
Webster Thayer. Professor Frankfurter,in his article analyzed the testimony
of the witnesses, particularly as to the vital issue of identification of the de-
fendants and the circumstantial evidence in the record. In its tenor the article
purported to demonstrate that Sacco and Vanzetti were convicted not on evi-
dence but as the victims of a hysteria against "Reds" of alien blood and "anar-
chists."
Professor Frankfurter excoriated Judge Thayer in terms as scathing as any
in the annals of criticism of judicial conduct.61
Whether the condemnation of Judge Thayer was justified may be put to
one side. The fact that Professor Frankfurter enjoyed great prestige as a
leading personage in the law professoriate and among the bar might have
placed him in the same category as "a leader of a large following" or "a
powerful metropolitan newspaper," as in the present cases. That, too, may
59Another striking illustration is found in the famous Thomas J. Mooney case in the
California courts and in the Supreme Court of the United States which has a history
extending over two decades.
60ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March, 1927, reproduced verbatim in FRANKFURTER, LAW AND
POLITICS (OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1913-1938) [Archibald MacLeish and E. F. Prichard,
Jr., eds. (1939) 3 140-188. In the same month the article was published as a book,
FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927).
6 1
FRANKFuRTER, LAW AND POLITICS, op. cit. supra note 60, at 164, 167, 186-188.
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be put to one side. He, as a private citizen, expressed his opinion based upon
what he believed to be the facts. This he had an unquestionable right to do
under the shelter of the Constitution. But if the standards of judgment
espoused in the dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter had been applied
to Professor Frankfurter in 1927, he would have been in a perilous position.
What would have created the peril for Professor Frankfurter under Justice
Frankfurter's doctrine was the fact that when his article was written various
judicial proceedings available to the defendants had not yet been commenced
or completed. 6 2
Under those circumstances who would venture to say that the "reasonable
tendency" test as Justice Frankfurter would have it applied to "pending"
litigation would not have courted a severe penalty for what in the judgment
of this writer was clearly within the bounds of permissible comment by Pro-
fessor Frankfurter on a matter of tremendous public importance--justice
under law.
A Glaring Inconsistency in the Dissenting Opinion
By their stress upon the great latitude which should be accorded to the
courts of California in exercising historic means adapted to local conditions in
coping with the evil of obstructions to fair adjudication, the dissenting mem-
bers of the Court reasoned themselves into a glaring inconsistency. The
California courts, said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, chose to meet local situations
in the light of local institutions; the Supreme Court, he continued, "sitting
over three thousand miles away from a great state without knowledge of its
habits and needs in a matter which does not cut across the affirmative powers
02 Subsequent to the publication of Professor Frankfurter's article, mspra note 60, the
following proceedings took place as shown by the record in the case: (1) on April 5,
1927, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the denial of a motion of
defendant Madeiros made before Judge Thayer; (2) on April 9, 1927, sentence was
imposed on Sacco and Vanzetti; (3) from May 3, 1927, to August 3, 1927, the following
occurred: (a) a petition for clemency was addressed to Governor Fuller on May 3,
1927, (b) hearings were held by an Advisory Committee appointed by Governor Fuller
from July 11 to July 21, 1927, and (c) a decision denying clemency was announced on
August 3, 1927; (4) on August 6, 1927, a motion for revocation of sentence and a peti-
tion for writ of error were filed; (5) on August 8, 1927, the motion was denied by
Thayer; (6) on August 8, 1927, the petition was denied by Judge Sanderson; (7) peti-
tions for a writ of habeas corpus were denied by Mr. Justice Holmes of the United
States Supreme Court and by Judge Sanderson of the United States District Court on
August 10, 1927; (8) on August 16, 1927, exceptions to the denial of motion and petition
were argued in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and overruled on August 19,
1927; (9) petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied by Judge Morton of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals on August 20, 1927, and on the same day a petition for
stay and extension of time within which to apply to the United States Supreme Court
for writ of certiorari was Aenied by Mr. Justice Holmes of that Court, and another peti-
tion to the same effect was denied by Mr. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court on August
22, 1927. See FRAENxEL, THE SACCO-VANZEMrI CAsE (1931) xv.
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of the national government" must take fastidious care not to substitute its
judgment for that of the California courts by making its "private views the
measure of constitutional authority." In similar vein the dissenting opinion
asks:
"How are we to know whether an easy-going or stiffer view of what
affects the actual administration of justice is appropriate to local circum-
stances ? How are we to say that California has no right to model its
judiciary upon the qualities and standards attained by the English admin-
istration of justice, and to use means deemed appropriate to that end by
English courts? It is surely an arbitrary judgment to say that the Due
Process Clause denies California that right." 3
Such espousal of self-restraint in judicial nullification of state action and
of the right of California to follow English practices in contempt cases as a
model logically and in practical reality compels the conclusion that all three
of the Times editorials were within the ambit of California's power to adjudge
them contemptuous, unfortunate as such result would have been. Instead the
dissenting Justices inconsistently declared the first two editorials beyond the
reach of the contempt power while the third editorial was deemed to be
within its reach. This in itself demonstrates the vagaries of the dissenting
doctrine and its subjective character.
The self-contradiction between the theory and practice of the dissenting
opinion lays bare the dangers of sanctioning the "reasonable tendency" test
as an historic English standard. It is well known, and the dissenting opinion
so recognizes, that in England newspaper comment on pending litigation is
virtually proscribed by a stringent exercise of the contempt power." If Cali-
fornia can constitutionally copy this English pattern, why can it not be as
hard-boiled as it pleases by closing practically "all channels of public expres-
sion to all matters which touch upon pending cases"? The answer is that if
this can happen in England it can happen here. Fortunately the majority
decision precludes such a result.
6362 Sup. Ct. at 209.
64Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law (1935) 48 HAv. L.
Rv. 885. Goodhart quotes the following passage from Hughes, Contempt of Court and
the Press (1900) 16 L. Q. REv. 292:
"The Star Chamber and licenser of printing have disappeared, but there still remains
over the press of this country one disciplinary jurisdiction almost as stern and far-reach-
ing in its peculiar domain as that of the Star Chamber. It is that of the judge to punish
those who print or publish matter declared to be in contempt of the Court."
In quoting the above passage Goodhart says at page 886:
"It is by the doctrine of these criminal contempts committed out of court, sometimes
called constructive contempts, that what may, perhaps, be called a censorship of the
press has been established in England."
[Vol. 27
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS
Analysis of Editorial: "Probation for Gorillas?"
Turning to the third editorial, entitled "Probation for Gorillas?",65 on
which the majority and the minority differed, it is clear that its language and
the circumstances *surrounding its publication did not present an extremely
serious substantive evil of .disrespect for the judiciary and unfair administra-
tion of justice of such an extremely high degree as to justify summary punish-
ment.
Mr. Justice Black appraised the editorial as follows:
"From the indications in the record of the position taken by the Los
Angeles Times on labor controversies in the past, there could have been
little doubt of its attitude toward the probation of Shannon and Holmes.
In view of the paper's long-continued militancy in this field, it is incon-
ceivable that any judge in Los Angeles would expect anything but ad-
verse criticism from it in the event probation were granted. Yet such
criticism after final disposition of the proceedings would clearly have
been privileged. Hence, this editorial, given the most intimidating con-
struction it will bear, did no more than threaten future adverse criticism
which was reasonably to be expected anyway in the event of a lenient
disposition of the pending case. To regard it, therefore, as in itself of
substantial influence upon the course of justice would be to impute to
judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor, which we cannot accept as a
major premise. Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting in Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
United States, 247 U. S. 402, 424."66
The last reference was to the oft-quoted words of Mr. Justice Holmes in
his dissenting opinion in the Toledo case, in which Mr. Justice Brandeis
joined:
65The full text of the editorial follows:
"Two members of Dave Beck's wrecking crew, entertainment committee, goon squad or
gorillas, having been convicted in Superior Court of assaulting nonunion truck drivers,
have asked for probation. Presumably they will say they are 'first offenders,' or plead
that they were merely indulging a playful exuberance when, with slingshots, they fired
steel missiles at men whose only offense was wishing to work for a living without paying
tribute to the erstwhile boss of Seattle.
"Sluggers fQr pay, like murderers for profit, are in a slightly different category from
ordinary criminals. Men who commit mayhem for wages are not merely violators of the
peace and dignity of the State; they are also conspirators against it. The man who
burgles because his children are hungry may have some claim on public sympathy. He
whose crime is one of impulse may be entitled to lenity. But he who hires out his
muscles for the creation of disorder and in aid of a racket is a deliberate foe of organized
society and should be penalized accordingly.
"It will teach no lesson to other thugs to put these men on good behavior for a
limited time. Their 'duty' would simply be taken over by others like them. If Beck's
thugs, however, are made to realize that they face San Quentin when they are caught,
it will tend to make their disreputable occupation unpopular. Judge A. A. Scott will
make a serious mistake if he grants probation to Matthew Shannon and Kennan Holmes.
This community needs the example of their assignment to the jute mill."6662 Sup. Ct. at 198-199.
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"I confess that I cannot find in all this or in the evidence in the case
anything that would have affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still
less can I find there anything that obstructed the administration of justice
in any sense that I possibly can give to its words." 67
The editorial "Probation for Gorillas?" must also be considered from the
standpoint of the practices prevailing in the Los Angeles criminal courts in
probation proceedings. 68  As set forth'in the brief of petitioners, it is a long
established practice in California for a probation officer to invite opinions on
the advisability of granting a probation. The Times was aware of this cus-
tom. In fact, in one case in which the Times editorially criticized the granting
of probation the judge before whom the application was made advised the
Times that its position should have been made known while the application
was pending.69 In the field of criminal law, complaints about ill-advised
clemency are frequently expressed. 7
It should be added that "Probation for Gorillas ?" made no attack upon the
judge's character nor was he charged with prejudice or political bias.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation that the editorial made an explicit
demand of the judge that the defendants be denied probation and that they
be sent to the "jute mill" seems unfounded. The whole tenor of the editorial
was to the effect that the good of the community required a denial of proba-
tion. But this was expressed as an opinion rather than as a demand and was
in keeping with the settled policy of the Times in condemning violence in
labor disputes.71
It is an exaggeration to construe the language as a threat to impartial adju-
dication. The dissenting opinion on this phase of the case was apparently
emotionally conditioned by the thought that the Times is a powerful metro-
politan newspaper. Mr. Justice Frankfurter uses this appellation in at least
67Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 424, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1918),
quoted by Mr. Justice Black (62 Sup. Ct. at 201) with reference to the alleged tendency
of the Bridges telegram, mtpra note 2, to interfere with the course of justice. Mr. Justice
Black, "with an eye on the realities of the situation," felt that a judge who was not in-
timidated by the facts themselves could not have been sidetracked by an explicit state-
ment of them.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the otlier hand, found it "inadmissible dogmatism" to say
that in the context of the immediate case the publication of the telegram could not have
"dominated" the mind of the judge.
68Petitioners' Brief on Reargument in United States Supreme Court, Times-Mirror
Co. and L D. Hotchkiss v. Superior Court of California, at 13-14; Transcript of Record,
id. at 52, 53-57.69Transcript of Record, id. at 52.
7OSee Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Association in the Supreme Court of
the United States as Amicus Curiae, Times-Mirror Co. and L. D. Hotchkiss v. Superior
Court of California, at 19-21.
"
1 See affidavit of Harry Chandler, publisher of the Los Angeles Times, Transcript of
Record, supra note 68, at 42-52.
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three places in his opinion. "A powerful newspaper," he says, "admonished a
judge, who within a year would have to secure popular approval if he desired
continuance in office, that failure 'to comply with its demands would be 'a
serious mistake.' "72 In his view this amounted to coercive power. But this
ascribes to this particular editorial a coercive power that might be ascribed
to the other two editorials in the case or to any of the Times editorials, if the
theory of the dissent is taken seriously. For according to its theory that the
views of a powerful newspaper tend to intimidate judges, particularly elected
judges, would not such judges be just as sensitive to mildly expressed views
as to those clothed in forthright language? Since the long established policy
of the Times over a period of 50 years on labor issues was publicly known
and had been expressed in hundreds of Times editorials, no one would be so
fatuous as to believe that this one editorial in condemnation of violence against
non-union workers and in opposition to a lenient probation policy in such
cases would intimidate a judge. "The influ'ential power -of the press to
startle the judiciary into publicity-coerced decisions has been absurdly magni-
fied by the courts." 73
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's argument to the contrary is based upon an un-
realistic assumption that in the case of the Gorilla editorial a California
judge had shut himself from contacts with newspaper editorial opinion and
had received a sudden shock when this particular editorial was called to his
attention. The truth of the matter is that no California judge worthy of
his office would suppose that he could insulate himself against the impact of
well-settled editorial policies of any newspaper, including the Times. "If a
judge absorbs substantial press influence at all, it is rather from press policy
established prior to the case being tried." 74 This would also be applicable to
the editorial "Sit-Strikers Convicted" which, in the words of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, "expressed exulting approval" of the jury's verdict of guilt, or of
the editorial "Fall of an Ex-Queen" which "luridly draws a moral from a ver-
dict of guilty in a sordid trial." If stiff sentences were imposed, readers
might just as readily assume that the latter editorials influenced the courts as
to suppose that the court would deny probation because of the third editorial.
It would be equally applicable to all future cases.
Characterizing the issue in the case as trial by newspapers substitutes a
rhetorical slogan for calm judgment concerning the vital functions of the
press.7 5 Out of the great volume of editorial comment and criticism printed
7262 Sup. Ct. at 211.
73(1938) 48 YALE L. J. 54 at 62.
74Ibid.
75 0ne cannot read Mr. Justice Franldurter's dissent without recalling how, while a
professor of law, he sought to use the press-not only the newspaper but the periodical
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in the columns of the newspapers of this country only an insignificant per-
centage of these publications has been questioned by the courts in contempt
proceedings. In this the press may well take pride. Lapses from proper
standards of journalism are relatively few and are certainly no greater 'in
proportion than in the professions generally. Trial by newspaper in the
epithetical sense of the term is unworthy of mention in an opinion of the Su-
preme Court.
Freedom of the press is a guarantee for the big and for the little, for the
powerful and for the weak. The mere existence of the power of a person with
a large following or a newspaper with a large circulation is not determina-
tive of the constitutional issue. What matters is how and to what end the
power is wielded. Freedom of expression does not vary inversely to the
prestige of the utterer or the power of the medium in which the utterances
appear.
It is difficult to reconcile Mr. Justice Frankfurter's version of the effect of
the editorial under discussion and his observations in another part of his
opinion on the status of judges as persons and courts as institutions. In that
connection he said that they are "entitled to no greater immunity from criti-
cism than any other persons or institutions"; that "judges must be kept mind-
ful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous
stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt"; that "courts and
judges must take their share of the gains and pains of discussion which is
unfettered except by laws of libel, by self-restraint, and by good taste"; that
the purpose is "not to protect the court as a mystical entity or the judges as
individuals or as anointed priests set apart from the community and spared
the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are exposed." 76
In their context these observations may be taken as referring both to com-
pleted and pending judicial actions, since Justice Frankfurter states more than
once that "the purpose is to protect immediate litigants and the public from
the mischievous danger of an unfree or coerced tribunal. '77
All of these observations are of the same import as the following excerpt
from Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion:
"The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shield-
ing judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of
American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak
and pamphlet press-in his campaign to upset the verdict and discredit the judge in the
Sacco-Vanzetti case. He even went so far in that campaign as to praise a great metro-
politan newspaper for a frank reversal of its editorial position in which it "long held the
view that the sentence against these men should be carried out." FRANKFuRTER, LAW
AND PoLiTics, op. cit. mepra note 60 at 186.
7662 Sup. Ct. at 206, 207, 208.
77Id. at 208.
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one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on, all public
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the
name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender
resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance
respect" 78
Making every allowance for differences of judgment in the application of a
standard, whatever it may be, to the circumstances of a particular case, it is
difficult to arrive at any other conclusion than to say that the dissenting Jus-
tices allowed an undue range to imaginary fears attributable only to a thin-
skinned judge or an insulated court in their appraisal of the effects of the one
editorial on which they disagreed with the majority.
In Conclusion
The majority of the Court do more than protect the individual rights of a
labor leader and a newspaper. The majority opinion gives unstinted support
to a free press as a right of the people throughout the land, fittingly charac-
terized by Professor Chafee as "a declaration of national policy in favor of the
public discussion of all public questions." 79 The Court now reiterates that
this policy safeguards the right from erosion by exercise of state power as
well as by exercise of federal power. An untrammeled press is an organ of
opinion essential to free government. A narrow interpretation of the First
Amendment is relegated by the Court to the limbo of historical errors. By its
forthright adoption of the "clear and present danger" test the Court has
given that vitality to the guarantee of a free press which our forefathers
intended. It has even warned that the furthermost boundaries of protected
expression have not yet been marked out. Never before has the First
Amendment been given stich resplendent armor to make a reality of the
memorable language of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Grosjean v. American
Press Company:80
"A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the gov-
ernment and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."
78d at 197.
79CrAFE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 6.
80297 U. S. 233, 250, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 449 (1936).
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